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PRODUCTION CONTROL IN THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY:
A CRITICAL ANALYSISt
John Vafai*
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is twofold: First, to study a moti-
vational relationship between production programming in the inter-
national petroleum industry and prorationing in the United States;
and second, to demonstrate certain deficiencies of the prorationing
mechanism in the United States and certain problems of production
programming in the international petroleum industry.'
International petroleum is the most dynamic energy resource
in the world. More than seventy-five percent of primary energy in
the United States2 and sixty percent of energy in the world is sup-
plied by petroleum and natural gas.' In 1970, 2,334 Million tons of
petroleum were necessary (and were produced) to meet the energy
needs of the world.4 In view of the extreme importance of petroleum
as a source of energy, it is of primary significance to examine the
production policies within the international petroleum industry. The
f The author is deeply indebted to Professor Eugene Rostow for comments
on the early draft of this work, and to Miss Jeanne Eisler for assistance in re-
search.
* LL.B., University of Teheran; LL.M., Yale University; J.S.D., Yale Uni-
versity; Associate Professor, Rutgers University; Visiting Fellow, Yale University
(1970-71).
1 Necessarily, the intention here is not a detailed analysis of the prorationing
policy in the United States, nor a study of the cost and price implications of
prorationing. A discussion of the policies adopted by exporting countries which
are indirectly related to production programming is not a part of this work.
Many of these areas have been discussed in J. VAFAI, THiE FEASIBILITY Or PRO-
DUCTION CONTROL IN THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (soon to be pub-
lished by Fredrick A. Praegers, New York). For the purpose of this article,
only a few problems of the OPEC Transitory Production Programme and the
Joint Production Programme (proposed by the Caracas Resolution of December
1970) will be discussed.
2 Crude oil accounts for about forty-five percent and natural gas for about
thirty percent of the United States' energy requirements. A. Ensor, United
States Energy Policy, in INTERNATIONAL OIL AND ENERGY POLICIEs OF TIE
PRODUCING AND CONSUMING COUNTRIES 34 (a Collection of Papers presented at
the OPEC Seminar held in Vienna, July 1969) [hereinafter cited as OPEC
Seminar].
3 Id.
4 Petroleum Press Service 6 (Jan. 1971).
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complexity of the production policy of this industry is readily
acknowledged by all who are familiar with it. Understanding the
relationship between the production policy in the international petro-
leum industry and prorationing in the United States requires a
study of the institutional developments which have taken place in
the past decade. The most important of these developments was
the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in 1960.1 OPEC is a permanent organization composed of
countries which produce and export oil in substantial amounts. A
country must not only be a producer but also a substantial exporter
to qualify for membership in OPEC.' Today, ten exporting coun-
tries are members of this organization, whose headquarters are in
Vienna.7 Membership is globally spread from Africa (Libya and
Algeria), to Latin America (Venezuela), to the Far East (Indone-
sia), and to the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Abu Dhabi).' In 1970 OPEC members collectively
supplied over eighty-five percent of petroleum exports 9 to the
consuming countries."0
OPEC is not an isolated regional institution. By the recom-
mendations of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) in 1965, by unanimous approval of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ESOSOCO),' n and in ac-
cordance with Articles 57 and 63 of the United Nations Charter,
OPEC established formal relations with the United Nations. 2 OPEC
5 For a detailed analysis of OPEC's structural organization, its accomplish-
ments and failures, see J. Vafai, 1 The Changing Structure of the International
Petroleum Industry: A Lexo-Economic Analysis, ch. 5 1970 (unpublished disserta-
tion on file at Yale Law School).
6 Both the Soviet Union and Nigeria are exporting countries (producing in
1970, 353 and 53 Million tons respectively. Petroleum Press Service 7 (Jan. 1971)) but
are not members of OPEC.
7 On December 6, 1965, OPEC and the Republic of Austria entered into an
agreement entitled "Headquarters Agreement," (effective January 1, 1966) in
which the Austrian government recognized the extra-territoriality of OPEC head-
quarters "which shall be under the authority and the control of OPEC." See
OPEC, Agreement Between the Republic of Austria and the OPEC Regarding
the Headquarters of the OPEC, Dec. 30, 1965.
8 The recently independent country of Bahrain has applied for membership
with the chances of her becoming a member quite strong. Middle East Economic
Survey 4 (Supp. July 3, 1970).
9 The Economist 59 (Jan. 23, 1971).
10 OPEC members produce about forty percent of world oil. OPEC BUT-
LETiN No. 4, at 1 (1970).
11 In this respect, a draft resolution was submitted to the Council by six
OPEC members. The draft resolution was passed unanimously on June 30, 1965.
See E/Res/1053 (XXXIX) (1965).
12 The resolution of the Geneva Conference of the Economic and Social
Council requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to take appro-
priate steps to: (a) ensure reciprocal exchange of information and documenta-
tion between OPEC and the United Nations; (b) provide for the representation
of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries at meetings of United
Nations organs dealing with matters of mutual interest; and (c) provide for
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participates in the deliberation of the Board of UNCTAD' 3 without
the right to vote, "on questions within the scope of its activities."14
The organizational structure of OPEC includes the Confer-
ence,"3 the Board of Governors,' the Secretariat, 17 the Economic
consultation and technical cooperation between the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries and the United Nations on matters of common interest.
See OPEC, NOTE ON RESOLUTION IX.61., at 9-10; A. MARTINEZ, OUR GI=T, OUR
OIL 116 (N. V. Drukkerij D. Reidl-Dordrecht, Vienna 1966) [hereinafter cited
as MARTINEZ].
13 OPEC, OPEC AND THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES 2, 6 (May 1967).
14 MARTINEZ, supra, note 12, at 116.
15 The Conference, which meets twice a year by the order of its president
(art. 12), is the supreme authority of the Organization. It consists of representa-
tives of member countries, each accorded one vote (art. 11). All its decisions
must receive the unanimous approval of the members. Its basic function is to
formulate the general policy of the Organization and to determine the appro-
priate ways and means of its implementation (art. 15(1)). The Conference is
vested with the following powers:
1. To consider and pass upon applications for membership in OPEC;
2. To confirm the appointment of members of the Board of Governors;
3. To direct the Board of Governors to submit reports or make recommen-
dations on any matters of interest to OPEC;
4. To consider the reports and recommendations submitted by the Board
of Governors on the affairs of OPEC;
5. To decide budgetary matters as submitted by the Board of Governors;
6. To approve or reject the Statement of Accounts and the Auditor's Re-
port submitted by the Board of Governors;
7. To approve any amendment to the OPEC Charter;
8. To call the Consultative Meeting for such purposes, and in such places,
as the Conference deems fit;
9. To appoint the Chairman of the Board of Governors, Secretary Gen-
eral, Deputy Secretary General, and the Auditor of OPEC; and,
10. To establish specialized organs that operate within the general frame-
work of the Secretariat, both functionally and financially (art. 41 (A
& B)). OPEC Res. V. III, 56 (ch. IV, at 97).
This list is not exhaustive. If, in the future, certain matters arise which are not
expressly assigned to one of OPEC's organs, the Conference will assume compe-
tence and jurisdiction upon those matters. See generally OPEC, THE STATUTE
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE OPEC, chs. II and III; OPEC Res. 11.6 and VIII
56.1.
16 The Board of Governors consists of Governors nominated by the mem-
ber countries and confirmed by the Conference (art. 17(A)). It holds its meet-
ings at least twice a year at the Secretariat, at suitable intervals to be deter-
mined by the Chairman of the Board after consultation with the Secretary
General (art. 18(A)). The Chairman of the Board of Governors is appointed in
accordance with the alphabetical rotation of the member countries by the OPEC
Conference from among the Governors to serve for one year. The date of mem-
bership in OPEC takes precedence over the principle of alphabetical rotation
(art. 21). The term of each Governor is two years (art. 17 (E)).
The Board of Governors has the following powers:
1. To direct the management of the affairs of OPEC and implement the
decisions of the Conference;
2. To consider and pass upon any reports submitted by the Secretary
General;
3. To submit reports and make recommendations to the Conference;
4. To draw up the budget of OPEC for each calendar year and submit it
to the Conference for its approval;
5. To nominate the Auditor of OPEC;
1971]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
Commission, s and the Consultative Meeting.19 These legislative
6. To consider the statement of accounts and the Auditor's Report and
submit them to the Conference for its approval;
7. To approve the appointment of department heads, upon nomination by
member countries, giving due consideration to the recommendations of
the Secretary General;
8. To convene an extraordinary meeting of the Conference (art. 18 (B));
9. To nominate a Deputy Secretary General to be appointed by the Con-
ference; and,
10. To prepare the agenda for the Conference. See generally OPEC Res.
VIII. 56, II, at 87-90; Art. 20(1-10).
17 The Secretariat is the executive and research branch of OPEC. It carries out
the functions of the Organization in accordance with its Charter and direction
of the Board of Governors (art. 25). The Secretary General, Deputy Secretary
General, and staff of the different executive departments are the component parts
of the Secretariat (art. 26). The chief duties of the Secretary General are:
1. To organize and administer the work of OPEC;
2. To ensure that the functions assigned to the different executive depart-
ments of the Secretariat are carried out;
3. To prepare reports for submission to each meeting of the Board of
Governors concerning matters which call for consideration and deri-
sion;
4. To inform the Chairman and other members of the Board of Governors
of all Secretariat activities, of all studies undertaken, and of the prog-
ress of the implementation of the resolutions of the Conference;
5. To make any public statement regarding decisions taken by the Con-
ference, the Board of Governors, or the Consultative meeting (art.
37(B)) ;
6. To ensure due performance of duties which may be assigned to the
Secretariat by the Conference or the Board of Governors;
7. To appoint the chiefs of departments (with approval of the Board of
Governors (art. 31(A))), and officers of the Secretariat (upon nomina-
tion by their respective governments) (art. 31(2)) ;
8. To commission consultants, as necessary, to advise on special matters or
to conduct export studies when such work cannot be undertaken by the
Secretariat (art. 39(A) ; OPEC Res. VI .46 as amended) ;
9. To engage such specialists or experts as OPEC needs for a period to be
approved by the Board of Governors, provided there is a provision for such
appointment in the budget (art. 39(B)) ; and
10. To convene "Working Parties" to carry out any studies on specific sub-
jects of interest to the member countries (art. 39(C); OPEC Res. VI.46
as amended).
The Secretary General is the legally authorized representive of OPEC and the
chief officer of the Secretariat (art. 27(A)). In this capacity he has the authority
to direct the affairs of the Organization (art. 27(B)). The Secretary General is
elected by the Conference of OPEC for a period of three years (Res. XX.117).
The charter takes specific note of the international status of officials of the
Secretariat and prohibits conduct not in accordance with such status:
"The Staff of the Secretariat are international employees with an exclusively
international character. In performing their duties, they shall neither seek nor
accept instruction from any government or from any other authority outside
OPEC. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position
as international employees and they shall undertake to carry out their duties
with the sole object of bearing the interests of the organization in mind." Art.
32. The Secretariat is composed of the Administration Department, Legal De-
partment, Information Department, Technical Department, and Economics De-
partment. See Art. 33(1); OPEC BULLETiN 2 (Feb. 1967).
18 The Economic Commission was established under the OPEC Resolution
of November 1964. OPEC's agenda required creating a special organ to:
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and administrative bodies have provided a forum for gathering and
disseminating information and communication among the members
and colloquy on issues which commonly concern the oil exporting
countries, e.g., price structure, relinquishment process, national oil
company organization. No doubt through these communicatory pro-
cesses OPEC has contributed to the economic consciousness of the
under-developed oil exporting countries."
The actual accomplishments of OPEC have been related to
two issues: royalties and taxes. OPEC introduced a new method of
royalty calculation-Expensing Royalties 2 -which, after a long
1. Establish the necessary contacts with private and public bodies, in par-
ticular, in the oil industry;
2. Collect data and information which OPEC may require to achieve its
objectives;
3. Examine the position of petroleum prices on a permanent basis;
4. Study all economic and other factors that may in any way affect petro-
leum prices and price structure significantly;
5. Submit to OPEC countries reports on the position of petroleum prices,
including relevant economic factors and current status of the Commis-
sion's recommendations; and,
6. Formulate and submit to the Conference relevant recommendations based
on its findings. See generally OPEC, Statute of the OPEC Commission,
OPEC Resolutions 1.1, IV and V. The Economic Commission is composed
of the Commission Board, The National Representatives, and the Com-
mission Staff.
19 The Consultative Assembly is a special body composed of heads of member
countries' delegations or their representatives (art. 40(B)). In practice, Consultative
meetings have been rare but theoretically, if a Conference is not in session, a Con-
sultative meeting may be convened at any time at the request of the President of
the Conference (art. 40(D)). The Consultative Assembly may make decisions, or it
may merely make recommendations for consideration at the next Conference
(art. 40(C)). The President of OPEC's Conference is responsible for preparing the
agenda for each Consultative meeting (art. 15(G)).
20 For more details see M. Tehranian, Origins, Development Problems and
Prospects of OPEC: An Essay in Political Economy, 1969 (dissertation on file at
Harvard University).
21 "Expensing" royalties has been one of the most controversial issues in the
international petroleum industry's recent economic history. Since its founding,
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has been determined to
change the structure of three basic elements of the present international oil in-
dustry: royalties, prices, and the production of crude oil. The royalty issue has
been the most successful struggle of OPEC vis-h-vis the Internation Oil Com-
panies. Under the 50/50 concession agreements, the IOC were obliged to pay, as
a part of the producing country's share, 12 1/2 percent of the crude oil produc-
tion in cash or in kind. This percentage was usually treated as a direct credit
against the total tax liability of the concessionaire companies which amounts to
fifty percent of their net profits. Thus, royalty payments were not deducted
from the gross income of the IOC as expense items in computing the income tax
owed to the OPEC members, but rather were credited directly against the tax
payable to the producing country. In its Resolution of June 8, 1962, OPEC
challenged this system and recommended that: "Each Member Country affected
[by the royalty issue] should approach the Company or Companies concerned
with a view to working out a formula whereunder royalty payments shall be
fixed at a uniform rate which Members consider equitable, and shall not be
treated as a credit against income tax liability." OPEC Res. IV.33.
OPEC insisted that royalties should be "expensed," i.e., treated as costs
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struggle winm the International Oil Companies (IOC), 22 has been
accepted by the latter and since 1968 practiced by the exporting
member countries. The second accomplishment of OPEC was to
break the traditional fifty-fifty tax system. The December 1970
Resolutions of the OPEC Conference instructed the member coun-
tries "to establish fifty-five percent as the minimum rate of taxation
on the net income of the oil companies operating in the Member
Countries. 23 In early 1971 the IOC adopted the new tax base in
most of the OPEC countries. 4
The fundamental principles of OPEC's Petroleum Policy have
been described as follows:
(1) Optimization of Member Countries' Benefits from the Exploitation
of their Petroleum Resources;
(2) Integrating the oil industry with the National Economy of the
Producing Countries; and
(3) Efficient Development and Conservation of Petroleum Resources. 25
These goals are all related to a uniform production policy in the
OPEC community, and reflect the United States' production control
systems in many ways. Just as the prorationing mechanism in the
United States has been given many justifications, numerous reasons
have been offered for global prorationing. Because there are funda-
mental parallels between the two prorationing concepts, and because
these parallels are not easily recognized, the United States' prora-
tioning systems as a model for past and proposed international prora-
before determining the profits. In such accounting, royalty payments would be
treated as operating costs and deducted from gross income like any other ex-
pense, and income tax would be paid on net earnings. Thus, the IOC would
pay a fifty percent income tax plus a certain percentage of production (in cash
or in kind) which would constitute the royalty. Finally, negotiation between the
IOC and certain OPEC members took place, and after a period of hard bar-
gaining, frustration and procedural maneuvers, an agreement with regard to
expensing royalties was reached in London on November 12, 1964, with OPEC
represented by both its Secretary General and the President of its Sixth Con-
ference. This agreement was supplemented by the same parties in 1968. For an
analysis of expensing royalties, see J. Vafai, supra, note 5, at 414-544.
22 These companies are Standard Oil Company (N.J.), Standard Oil Com-
pany (Calif.), Mobil Oil Corporation, Texaco, Gulf Oil Corporation, Royal-
Dutch Shell, British Petroleum and Compagnie Franqaise de Pitroles (CPF).
These companies control approximately eighty-five percent of the crude oil out-
side the United States and the Communist sphere, and seventy percent of
refinery throughput and of total petroleum product sales in this area. See
J. HARTSHORN, POLITICS AND WORLD OIL ECONOMICS 114-26 (1967). The IOC's
share of output from the OPEC area is about eighty-four percent. OPEC BUL-
LETm No. 6, at 9 (1970).
23 OPEC Res. XXI.120.
24 In late 1970 by special legislation, Venezuela raised its tax level on oil
income to sixty percent. Thus among the OPEC members, Venezuela enjoys the
highest income tax on crude oil production.
25 OPEC ButLLEim; No. 6, at 1 (1970).
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tioning will be briefly discussed. Furthermore, any prorationing
system must be distinguished from pure conservation measures in
order to reach an understanding of production control. And finally,
the policies, programs, mechanisms and obstacles of production
control will be discussed as they have applied to the OPEC area in
the past, and possibly in the future as they effect the newly proposed
Joint Production Programme.26
PRORATIONING IN THE UNITED STATES
Market demand prorationing may be defined as a sytem of
adjusting production to expected demand.27 Each state establishes
a regulatory agency to determine the allowables for that state.28 A
description of the mechanism by which this determination is made
is tortuous 29 and therefore, for the purpose of clarity, only an overly
simplified model will be drawn.80 The regulatory agency in each
state holds hearings to determine expected future consumption.31
The purchase of crude oil (mostly the refiners) indicate their nomi-
nation (anticipated requirement) for each ensuing period. By
considering factors such as the actual and required amount of
crude oil in storage and in pipeline, the imports, production and
storage in other states, the regulatory agency determines the ex-
pected consumption. Nationwide estimates are decided by the United
States Bureau of Mines, which are then available to the state regula-
tory agency as a general guideline.2
26 The phrase "production programming" has been used in the interna-
tional petroleum industry and particularly in the OPEC and Arab Petroleum
Congress (APC) circles. "Prorationing" has been used both in and out of the
United States. For all practical purposes they connote the same concept.
27 For the legal validity of prorationing, see Julian Oil and Royalties Co. v.
Capshaw, 145 Okla. 23, 292 P. 841 (1930); Dancigar Oil & Refining Co. v. R.R.
Commission of Texas, 49 S.W. 2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Champlin Refining Co.
v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1931); J. ROGERS,
COMMON PURCHASER, MARKET DEMAND, PINELINE PRORATION, Ninth Annual
Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, South Western Legal Foundation,
Dallas, Texas 63 (1958).
28 For an evaluation of the statutory authorities of the regulatory agencies,
see P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTITY ECONOMICS 260-93 (1963).
29 See generally E. ZIMMERMAN, CONSERVATION IN THE PRODUCTION OF
PETROLEUM 328-43 (1959); W. LOVEJOY & P. HOMAN, PROBLEMS OF COST ANAL-
YSIS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 59-79 (1964); M. NFAvE, The Conservation
of Oil and Gas, MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 201-36 (1969); M. ADELMAN, THE SUPPLY
AND PRICE OF NATURAL GAS 77-84 (1962).
30 For an excellent analysis of prorationing in the United States, see W. LOVEJOY
& P. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION 127-84, 237-60
(published for Resources for the Future, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as OIL CONSERVATION].
81 See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6049d (1962); G. Dutton, Proration
in Texas: Conservation or Confiscation, 11 Sw. L. J. 187 (1957).
32 J. Marshall & N. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production, 41 YALE
L. J. 33, 53 (1931).
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Once the state allowables are decided in a market demand
order, the second stage begins-allocation of allowables among the
pools and wells in a particular state. Different technical factors are
taken into consideration in determining pool and well allowables,
such as the "yardstick" or "top allowables", 3 and spacing. Based
on these considerations, each pool (and within each pool, each well)
receives its share of the state's total estimated demand. The
amount of production allocated to the pool by the regulatory agency
under the market demand mechanism might coincide with the
maximum efficient rate of production (MER) of that pool. 4 In that
case prorationing acts as a conservation device. But such a coinci-
dence is merely accidental.8 It is precisely this phenomenon which
allows a confusion between conservation and prorationing to be used
as a justification for the market demand system."' Despite such
adroit confusion, market demand prorationing is clearly the cause of
economic waste and misallocation of resources.
One problem with market demand prorationing is that the
aggregated amount of production is controlled by mutual agreement
between the regulatory agency and the purchasers of crude oil. If
this is not a conspiracy to limit the supply of oil as has been sug-
gested by some,87 it is a collaboration between the regulatory agency
and purchasers to control the amount of production. The regulatory
agency does not authorize production of a barrel of oil unless it is
sure that the purchaser will take it. Therefore, the industry's supply
is not dictated by the interplay of market forces, but by a collective
88 For definitions, see OI. CONSERVATION, supra, note 30, at 142.
84 Under the MER method, production is scheduled in such a way that the effi-
ciency of the driving forces for production, and thus, the recoverable oil from the
reservoir, will be maximized. The rate of production under the MER system could be
determined irrespective of considerations such as market demand, transportation facil-
ities, or a specific interest of a group of producers. It must be noted that MER should
be used not only as an engineering concept, i.e., maximizing the number of barrels
within the given physical structure, but also as an economic concept, i.e., consideration
of engineering factors plus consideration of present and future prices and costs. It is
only with economic MER that conservation may be sought after. Under these con-
siderations the maximum ultimate recovery would not mean to recover the last drop
of oil at any cost. Conservation would not imply limiting the efficient well production
for the more costly and inefficient marginal well under economic MER.
85 E. ROSTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 120-24 (1948).
86 An interesting discussion could be made regarding the cost of production at the
MER level as opposed to below MER. One of the major reasons that the average cost
per barrel of oil in the OPEC area is less than in the U.S. is the fact that production
in the OPEC area is basically at the MER level. M. Adelman, The World Oil Outlook,
in NATURAL RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 34-46 (M. Clawson ed.
1964); M. ADELMAN, OIL PRODUCTION COSTS IN FOUR AREAS 96 (Proceedings of the
Council of Economics of the American Institute of Mining, Metalogical and Petroleum
Engineers, Inc., Feb.-Mar. 1966).
37 For a discussion on this point, see OI. CONSERVATION, supra, note 30, at 140.
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decision based upon the market demand. Given the present import
restriction,"s the interplay of competitive forces from in and out of
the United States are effectively controlled. Limitation of production
in this manner will surely maintain the prices above their competi-
tive level. At this price level new exploratory activities will take
place; new capacities will be provided; and new discoveries will be
made. The regulatory agency has to make room for new discoveries
(irrespective of cost factors). This simply means that, given a con-
stant demand,89 allowables for the old pools have to be reduced
despite the fact that their MER capacity has not changed. As one
authority indicates, in Texas allowables are based below their maxi-
mum efficient rate of production."' It is clear that an allowable is a
function of market demand rather than the efficiency of a reservoir.
To the extent that a reservior produces less than its MER level,
economic waste exists.
Another economic waste closely related to market demand
prorationing is development of idle capacity. Given artificially high
prices-a direct result of production control-investment in the
petroleum operation receives extra stimulation. 1 An idle capacity
will be created and the capital will be tied up in different phases
of the industry.4" It is extremely difficult to determine the extent of
idle capacity because there is no way to know what the "normal
capacity" would be, had it not been for market demand prora-
tioning.43 Professor Lovejoy has estimated that the annual costs
38 For a description of the United States import restriction, see THE CABINET
TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROL, THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION, A Report on the
Relationship of Oil Imports to the National Security 8-17 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION); E. SHAFFER, THE OIL IMPORT PROGRAMME OF THE
UNITED STATES (1968).
89 In practice the market demand has increased steadily in the United States. (In
1970 the United States overall demand for oil and natural gas liquids increased 4%
percent. Petroleum Press Service 6 (Jan. 1971).) Thus the old pools do not feel penal-
ized as a result of a newcomer. This however does not change the rationale of the
argument.
40 According to Professors Lovejoy and Homan, "[f]or practical purposes of set-
ting rates of production from reservoirs, MER appears at present to have no signifi-
cance, except in California, since restriction to market demand in most instances gives
a lower level than MER." OIL CONSERVATiON, supra, note 30, at 84.
41 For an analysis, see E. Kahn, The Combined Effects of Prorationing, The De-
pletion Allowance and Import Quotas on the Cost of Producing Crude Oil in the U.S.,
10 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 57 (1970).
42 See H. LuBELL, MIDDLE EAST OIL CRISES AND WESTERN EUROPE'S ENERGY
SUPPLIES 102 (1963).
43 There is, however, no doubt that excess investments are made in the United
States, particularly in the exploratory and developmental stages. According to Pro-
fessor Lovejoy, a total excess investment of 9.3 Billion dollars is made in excess pro-
ducing wells, excess dry holes, and excess idle equipment. See W. Lovejoy, Oil Conser-
vation, Producing Capacity and National Security, 10 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 92
(1970).
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of maintaining idle capacities are between 1 Billion and 1.5 Billion
dollars .4
Perhaps the most staggering waste under market demand
prorationing is the pattern of allocation of the allowables among
the pools and wells. Significant exceptions from market demand
prorationing have been granted in various cases.
The first and most important exception to the prorationing
system is that made for marginal wells.45 According to a conservative
estimate there are some 400,000 old marginal wells in the United
States, "most of their energy long since dissipated."4 The majority
of these wells are yielding not more than a few barrels each day.47
There are 20,000 marginal wells in Pennsylvania producing on the
average half a barrel each day. 8 It has been indicated that in one
case 17,600 flowing wells, with an average capacity of producing
more than a hundred barrels a day, had to curtail their average
scheduled daily allowables to twenty-one barrels per day per well
as a result of the application of the prorationing formula. This restric-
tion was made more stringent by the limitation of the flowing wells'
production to sixteen days during the month. As a result, the flowing
wells (with the potentials of hundreds of barrels per day) were
producing an average of twelve barrels a day per well when their
production per day was averaged over an entire month; whereas,
nine hundred marginal wells, producing at their full capacity every
day of the month, averaged more than twelve barrels per day per
well.49 This example indicates that prorationing has a definite penal-
izing effect upon the efficient wells and therefore is repugnant to the
idea of conservation.
The second exception to the prorationing system is the "dis-
44 Id. at 95.
45 A marginal well has been defined as "any oil well which is incapable of pro-
ducing its maximum capacity of oil except by pumping gas lifts or other means of
artificial lift." See The Marginal Well Act, Tax. Rtv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6049(b)2
(1962). For the purposes of prorationing, a marginal well is defined in terms of its
production as compared to the depth of the well. Therefore, as is the case in Texas, a
well which produces 100 barrels a day, without the aid of artificial lifting from a
2,000 foot depth is considered marginal. As the depth increases, production require-
ments for the well rise. Hence, if a well produces 35 barrels a day at 8,000 feet, it
will still be classified as marginal. See LovEjoy & HOMAN, PROBLEMS OF COST ANALY-
SIS IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra, note 29, at 69.
46 The Bank of New York, Petroleum Conservation, How America Is Making the
Most of Its Oil and Gas Revenues, 3 NATURAL RESOURCEs LAwYER 278 (1970).
47 Marginal wells have been distinguished from stripper wells. Wells with an
average production of 20-25 b/d are called marginal, and those with an average pro-
duction of less than 10 b/d are considered stripper wells. Both types are exempted
from the application of allowables. Petroleum Press Service 407 (Nov. 1967).
48 A. Kahn, supra, note 41, at 59.
49 G. Dutton, supra, note 31, at 187.
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covery" or "exploratory" well. The discovery allowable is a special
allowable assigned to wells completed in a particular oil pool for a
specified period of time. Until 1966 the discovery allowables in
Texas were limited to the first five wells completed in the field within
an eighteen month period. Since that year the Texas Railroad Com-
mission has become more generous in exempting the discovery fields
from market demand prorationing. The number of exempted wells
has doubled and the duration of the exemption has been increased
to two years.' Discovery allowables may exceed the usual per well
allowable for older wells; they are also not subject to the scheduled
allowable days which the older reservoirs generally follow.
Dense spacing is another phenomenon of discovery wells. Since
the spacing rules are not applicable to these wells until two years
have elapsed and ten wells are drilled, and since each well will re-
ceive a specific allowable irrespective of its distance from another
well, the producers will be encouraged to space them as densely as
possible (within the forty acre space limit allowed in Texas). Thus,
there are two misallocative effects in the second exception: First,
under market demand prorationing other reservoirs will have to
produce less in order to give room for the discovery wells, irrespec-
tive of productive capacity; and second, a general over-crowding
may occur which is costly and may reduce the ultimate recover-
ability of the discovery wells. There are also exemptions such as
"special orders" and "piercement salt dome fields," 51 the "capacity
water flood fields" and exemptions related to the "fair chance"
doctrine.52
All these exemptions are made at the cost of non-exempted
efficient wells which will have to produce less than their capacity.
Texas provides a striking illustration. In a given year the total allow-
ables in Texas were estimated to be 2,828,000 barrels per day from
which 1,248,000 were exempted.3 As a result, the non-exempted
wells had to bear the burden of exempted ones. The prorated wells
which-according to the Texas authorities--could produce 3,700,-
000 barrels per day were allowed to produce only 1,580,000 barrels
per day. The capacity of these wells was 232 percent of what was
allocated to them.5 4
The foregoing indicates that market demand prorationing has
caused an economic waste in the United States which far offsets its
50 Oi CoNsERVAT N, supra, note 30, at 159.
51 Id. at 155.
52 Dailey v. R.R. Commission, 133 S.W. 2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), error refd;
Morris v. R.R. Commission, 142 Tex. 293,177 S.W. 2d 941 (1944).
53 OM. CONSERVATION, supra, note 30, at 114.
54 Id.
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incidental conservational effects. Reacting to only one of these many
wastes-marginal wells-Professor Adelman appropriately stated:
"By all means, go get lostl In Texas alone it would be worth paying
about $1.3 Million a year to get rid of this public nuisance, a liability
masquerading as an asset ....
The United States as a Model for Production Control
Students of the petroleum industry have mainly treated the
problem of prorationing in an abstract manner. Most prorationing
analyses deal with regional prorationing in the United States, and
not global production control in the large exporting countries of the
world. Thus, no relationship between these two production programs
has been observed. Despite this limited and traditional approach
there does exist a real interconnection between the regional pro-
rationing policy in the United States and the global prorationing
policy in the exporting countries (except the Soviet Union). The
prorationing and conservation concepts of OPEC-with some con-
siderable exceptions which may be attributed to the differences
between the property systems prevailing in the OPEC area and
those in the United States-are a melange of the various conserva-
tion and prorationing systems adopted in this country by different
oil-producing states. The United States' conservation laws have
been the subject of serious study by both OPEC and the APC. In-
deed, some of the economists in these organizations have justified
global prorationing merely because it was originated and applied
on a national scale in the United States. For example, in the Sixth
Arab Petroleum Congress, held in March 1967, it was stated that:
Nobody can deny that conservation of natural resources and proration-
ing of its production are an American invention. Thus, one can never
do without deduction from the U.S. style of conservation as the oldest
and most stable style practiced on earth.
The adoption of an international prorationing system has become im-
perative and it has all its fair justifications. The system is mainly de-
duced from the methods used by the advanced nations, especially the
U.S.A.56
At the same Congress it was indicated that prorationing crude
oil on a market demand basis is "a legitimate behavior adopted by
the United States itself.157 The majority also rejected the point that
55 M. Adelman, Efficiency of Resources Use In Crude Petroleum, S. EcoN. J. 104
(Oct. 1964).
56 R. A. Kamel, International Proration of Oil and Its Impact on Prices, Sixth
APC 14 (Organized by the Secretariat General of the League of Arab States, Baghdad,
Mar. 6-13, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Sixth APC],
57 Id. at 14.
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prorationing may be detrimental to the interest of consuming coun-
tries on the ground that "controlling supply is a legitimate case
practiced by the U.S.A. and others .... ",5
The Sixth Arab Petroleum Congress makes it clear that United
States' prorationing has become a postulation for crude oil pro-
rationing on a global scale. In this Congress it was suggested by a
participant that:
1. For the purpose of obtaining an accurate world market demand,
an "organization like the United States Bureau of Mines must be
established."
2. The market demand must be allocated "among the fields and wells
by the competent authorities in each exporting country."
3. If the amount of crude oil produced exceeds the quota of any ex-
porting country "this situation has to be faced by a 'Hot Oil' law
applied on a world scale." The enforcement power of this "Inter-
national Connonly Act" is suggested to be given to consuming coun-
tries. Consuming countries will have to undertake "not to accept
any shipments produced in violation of the quota defined for each
exporting country." 59
Thus, the prorationing procedures adopted in the United
States have become a framework for the Arab oil prorationing
formula. This point was admitted even by the sponsors of the Sixth
APC Congress, as the following indicates:
The prorationing system is a deduction from the procedure of the
Texas Railroad Commission, the Corporation Commission of Okla-
homa, together with the harmony performed [sic] by the Interstate
Compact Commission and the Bureau of Mines. 60
Like the APC, OPEC has considered the establishment of a
mechanism whereby output would be determined according to mar-
ket demand at "fair" and stable prices. Such a policy is very similar
to the method adopted by the regulatory agencies in the United
States. Predictably, this was a theme to which OPEC returned in
December 1970. Although OPEC's "Transitory Production Pro-
gramme" of 1965 was formulated more modestly than its American
counterpart,6' its goals were certainly no less ambitious. The 1970
"Joint Production Programme" for 1972 can be expected to be in
the same vein.
58 id. at 19.
U Id. at 15.
60 Id. See also statements by Dr. A. el Kassam, id. at 9; and statements by F. Al
Hussainy, id. at 13-19.
61 J. HARTSHORN, supra, note 22, at 208, 344. OPEC emphatically denied at its
conferences in the Spring and Summer of 1965 that it was trying to control the total
production of its member countries.
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The United States' prorationing policy has been used as a
justification for the control of world crude oil production; in fact,
it has set a pattern according to which world oil production may be
controlled. 2 Furthermore, global prorationing is a reaction to the
restriction of production in the United States. This may be seen
from the fact that in the Fifth APC (March 1965) it was recom-
mended that unless the production and supply policy in the United
States was to change in favor of a more competitive system (which
would require the elimination of percentage depletion, of market
demand restrictions imposed by the states, and of import restrictions
imposed by the Federal Government), international prorationing
would be an indispensable self-protection policy to confront the
"chaos which is now prevailing in the world petroleum production.""5
Historic occurrences-the Achnacarry agreement and supple-
mentary "As is" agreements*--also indicate undeniable, if not
causal, relations between the conservation and prorationing policies
in the United States and those in the OPEC countries. As a promi-
nent petroleum economist has observed:
The impact of prorationing upon competitive positions is probably not
the only important feature of conservation policy. What mattered most
apart from the aspect of technology was the fact that only with a
certain degree of production could the U.S. be fitted into the world-
wide structure of the oil industry. Conservation was the missing link
which had to be forged.6 5
62 One of the examples of this pattern is the following address by the participants
of the United Nations International Seminar of 1968:
"One of the wealthiest and most powerful countries in the world has been so con-
cerned with this question of preserving its natural resources for future generations and
for future emergencies that it has established in the various regions within the nation,
a system of prorationing which ensures that various wells do not produce on an average
more than a certain number of barrels per day." See D. H. N. Alleyne, The Spectrum
of Government Involvement in the Administration of Petroleum Affairs, United Na-
tions International Seminar on Petroleum Administration No. 68-45777, Lecture No.
7, at 9-10 (Trinidad, Apr. 16-27, 1968).
63 M. Iskandar, World Oil Surplus in Relation to United States Imports, Deple-
tion and Prorationary Policies, 5th APC (Organized by the Secretariat General of the
League of Arab States, Cairo, Mar. 16-23, 1965).
64 This agreement is a classic example of global control of the world oil by Inter-
national Oil Companies. The machinery employed by these companies was one of the
most effective systems of controlling world petroleum. In pursuance of its monopolistic
production policy the "As is" grant adopted the following rules: Policy of industrial
resources; production control through a quota system; violation of over and under
trading regulations; zonal division of market; pooling transportation facilities and
administrative freight rates; method of effecting exchange of supplies; pooling conces-
sion areas; and pricing of crude oil. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM CARTEL, submitted by the Sub-committee on Monopoly of the Select Com-
mittee on Small Business, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) (also known as the FTC Cartel
Report).
65 P. FRANKEL, ESSENTIALS OF PETROLEUM 11 (1946).
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Establishment of a scale of production in the United States to fit
the world production scale was not the only "missing point." In-
creasing interests which the developing oil exporting countries have
shown in crude oil output was even a more important "missing
point" in the world system of production. These countries have
endorsed the United States' notion of conservation-prorationing. In
their conferences and organizations they have intellectualized the
conservation-prorationing notion to the extent that global proration-
ing has been presented as an international conservation system and
as a program vital to their economic planning. 66
Thus, it may be concluded that no thorough and realistic study
of crude oil production control in the OPEC area can be made
without an understanding of differences between a genuine conserva-
tion system and a prorationing scheme. Arriving at such an under-
standing presents difficulties which are created by the complexities
resulting from the multiple ownerships of the petroleum reserviors
in the United States and the different legal systems adopted by pro-
ducing states. Yet, successful concerted production control in the
United States and the OPEC area is the most effective measure
through which the price of oil could be maintained above the com-
petitive level. On the other hand, adoption of a scientific conserva-
tion system in the United States would considerably raise the effi-
ciency of national oil in competing with OPEC oil and thus would
be useful in shaping a "security oriented" oil policy. In the OPEC
area, adoption of conservation measures would serve the interests
of the developing oil producing countries in terms of their effective
use of petroleum for their economic developments.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRORATIONING AND CONSERVATION
Two basic justifications have been advanced for production
programming: Price of crude oil and conservation. In several APC
meetings it has been asserted that excess production in the exporting
areas is the cause of lower prices, and above and below ground waste.
It follows that a system of production policy, similar to the one
found in the United States, would be a cure for both lower prices
and wasteful production."1 This, however, is a misrepresentation of
66 See President H. Boumedienne's speech delivered at the opening of the 20th
OPEC Conference. OPEC BULLETIN No. 5, at 4 (1970) ; address by President Caldera
of Venezuela at the inagural ceremony of the 21st OPEC Conference. OPEC BULLETIN
No. 1, at 4-6 (1971); Sixth APC, supra, note 56, at 1-47(A-4) and No. 6, at 1-20;
OPEC Res. IV.33.
67 OPEC Res. IV.33. See also D. H. N. Alleyne, supra, note 62, at 9.
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both prorationing and conservation concepts. The origin of such
confusion is not from OPEC or APC, but the United States.
One such misrepresentation is found in a recommendation
made by the American Petroleum Institute, claiming that the
purpose of prorationing is "improvement in the conservation of
oil and gas." The Institute has recommended that:
1. The basic principles of alocation among pools . . . should be
observed, and
2. A definite basis for equitable allocation among pools should be
formulated by each producing state. 68
The American Petroleum Institute also recommended that the
states implement certain suggestions which would aid in the "solu-
tion of the intricate problems of conservation and allocation."89
Even the Interstate Oil Compact Commission (IOCC) has confused
the single unitization measure, which includes inter-field competition,
with various forms of prorationing in which the production is limited
and the price is kept artificially high.70 According to the IOCC regu-
lations, the goals of conservation may be achieved by eliminating:
1.. Physical waste, as that term is generally understood in the oil and
gas industry;
2. The inefficient, excessive, or improper use, or the unnecessary dis-
sipation of reservoir energy;
3. The inefficient storing of oil or gas;
4. The location, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of an oil
or gas well in a manner that causes, or tends to cause, reduction
in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from a pool
under prudent and proper operations;
68 AMRICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, PROGRESS REPORT ON STANDARDS ALLOCATION
OF PRODUCTION WITHIN POOLS AND AMONG POOLS 12 (by the Special Study Committee
and Legal Advisory Committe on Well Spacing and Allocation of Production Practice,
Division of Production, Dallas, Texas 1942).
69 Id. at 13.
70 Of course the IOCC has emphatically denied any intention to fix the prices
of crude oil in the United States. To be sure, Article V of the Oil Compact provides:
"It is not the purpose of this Compact to authorize the states joining herein to limit
the production of oil and gas for the purpose of stabilizing or fixing the price ... "
The same kind of denial has come from the members of the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion. The following testimony of a member of the Commission is an example:
Representative Mack-"Would you care to express an opinion as to why the
price of oil was increased in the last few weeks?"
General Thompson (for the Commission) -"Why?"
Mack-"How would you explain the increase in the price of fuel and oil in
the last few months?"
Thompson-"We have nothing to do with price. We are forbidden to consider
economics .... I know nothing about price." Petroleum Survey, Hearings be-fore the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R., 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., 187 (Feb. 5, 1957).
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5. The production of oil or gas in excess of
a) transportation or marketing facilities,
b) reasonable market demand .... 71
The first four points are conservation measures which would be
aplied under a sound unitization policy. The fifth point, that of
limiting production to estimates of market demand, aims at price
maintenance, not conservation.
The confusion of conservation with prorationing is not limited
to the regulatory agencies in the United States. Both OPEC and
APC consider 72 prorationing to be an integral part of conservation
measures because, as was stated in the Sixth Arab Petroleum Con-
gress, "rules requiring ratable take within a reservoir seem, beyond
question, essential to end gross waste in oil production which evoke
the need for conservation. ' 73 According to APC economists, conser-
vation means maintaining the following principles and setting limita-
tions for their exercise:
1. Spacing: restriction upon the number and location of wells;
2. Drilling operations: regulation of drilling and well completion
practices;
3. MER: restriction of production to the maximum efficient rate;
4. Proration: allocation of production between separately owned
tracts within a common source of supply;
5. Ratios: limitation of production in excess of an established gas-
oil and water-oil ratio;
6. Volumetric withdrawals: restriction of production of gas, oil, or
water to prevent excessive localized withdrawals. 74
Point four of the Arab Petroleum Congress is comparable to point
five of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission in which both delib-
erately confuse the question of conservation and prorationing. Both
the IOCC and APC have suggested that the goal which market
demand prorationing is intended to achieve is "to prevent both above
ground and below ground waste of oil."1
75
The confusion between prorationing and conservation, and the
general belief that prorationing prevents economic waste, may
71 INTERSTATE OM COMPACT COMnISSION, A FORM FOR AN OIL AND GAS CONSER-
VATION STATUTE § 1.1.1. (Oklahoma City 1959).
72 Neither the OPEC nor the APC has made an official pronouncement to equate
conservation with prorationing. The general trend in these organizations, however,
(particularly in the APC) has been toward such equation.
73 Sixth APC, supra, note 56, at 11.
74 Id. at 12.
75 Id. at 11. See W. RoERS, A STUDY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS IN HE
U.S. (IOCC 1964).
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provoke an emotional appeal in the countries in which the conces-
sionaires do not, and need not, apply market demand prorationing. 76
Passivity of oil companies in controlling production has been in-
terpreted as an extravagance on the part of these companies in
exploiting the natural resources of the developing countries while
"conserving" the resources of their own home states. President
Houari Boumedienne of Algeria speaking at OPEC's Twentieth
Conference is a case in point. He attacked, the United States, which
applies very strict rules "to the conservation of their own natural
resources while looting and wasting those of underdeveloped coun-
tries. 77 It was for this reason he stated that a "positive aspect of
OPEC's work" would be global prorationing.7 8
OPEC's position with respect to conservation and prorationing
is somewhat different from that of the Arab spokesmen. OPEC has
made at least "a conceptual distinction" between prorationing and
conservation. Despite the emphasis that OPEC has traditionally
applied to production control as a waste prevention measure, it has
also developed a modern model of conservation that the IOC's
should adopt in their concession agreements. OPEC's model was
revealed in the "Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy. 7 9
This document80 provided inter alia that:
S.. hydrocarbon resources are limited and exhaustible, and that their
proper exploitation determines the conditions of the economic develop-
ment of Member Countries, both at present and in the future;
. .. 8 1
Resolves . .. that Operators8 2 shall be required to conduct their op-
erations in accordance with the best conservation practices, bearing in
mind the long-term interests of the [exporting] country.8 3
76 Indeed, according to the view of some of the leaders of exporting countries,
prorationing has become a divine duty to implement "the social justice." See the
speech of President Caldera of Venezuela on the opening of the 21st OPEC Confer-
ence. OPEC BULLETIN No. 1 (1971).
77 OPEC BULLETIN No. 5 (1970). President Boumedienne did not mention the
United States in his speech, but since, of the "rich countries" of the world mentioned
in his address, the United States is the only one with comprehensive prorationing
regulations, it could be deduced that his main target was the U.S. See also Middle
East Economic Survey No. 37 (Supp. July 10, 1970).
78 OPEC BULE Tn No. 5 (1970).
79 For an analysis of the Declaratory Statement, see F. PARRA, OPEC: PRESENT
AND FUTURE ROLE, Continuity and Change in the World Oil Industry 135 (Middle
East Research and Publishing Center, Beruit 1970) ; Middle East Economic Survey No.
29 (Supp. May 16, 1969).
80 For the text of "Pro-Forma Regulation for the Conservation of Petroleum
Resources," see OPEC, SELECTED DOCU'MENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM IN-
DUSTRY, 1968, at 388-99 (Vienna 1969).
81 The other parts of this important resolution deal with the mode of develop-
ment, participation, relinquishment, posted prices, limited guarantee of fiscal stability,
renogotiation clause, accounts and information, and settlement of disputes. OPEC Res.
XVI.90.
82 OPEC has defined the word operator in this context as a concessionaire who
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To this end, OPEC's Secretariat prepared a "Pro-Forma Regu-
lation for the Conservation of Petroleum Resources" which was ap-
proved by the OPEC Conference in November 1968.84 The "Pro-
Forma Regulation" is a comprehensive guide for member countries
regarding exploration, exploitation, storage and transportation of
petroleum. It does not, however, include provisions regarding the
adoption of a uniform production policy by OPEC countries nor the
establishment of global prorationing.
The Pro-Forma Regulation of OPEC is a constructive work
which embodies the basic principles of conservation for its member
countries. And contrary to similar procedures adopted by the regu-
latory agencies in the United States, the Pro-Forma Regulation does
not incorporate conservation principles with those of production
control and market demand prorationing; it presents a distinct
conservation policy.
The Pro-Forma Regulation-a conservation guideline-has
received little formal attention in the OPEC countries."" Instead,
attention has been focused on formulating global market demand
prorationing. OPEC's resolutions and some of the producing coun-
tries have not hesitated to repeat that oil is a "wasting asset,"'86
whereas other natural resources such as agriculture and forestry
are reproducible and expandable. This theme was surely a source
of confusion between conservation and prorationing. The same
theme in the United States has been used to justify state prorationing
as well as depletion allowances.
In both the United States and the OPEC area production pro-
gramming has been defended on the ground of conservation of
natural resources. This allegation has enjoyed a considerable emo-
tional appeal on both sides. Interestingly, the Arab and Venezuelan
spokesmen and the United States regulatory agencies behave alike
by adroitly confusing, if not distorting, the concept of conservation
with that of prorationing.
A point of distinction seems inevitable. It is one thing to pre-
vent waste by eliminating, or reducing, the intra-field competition,
holds 'current and in effect' contracts and concessions "providing for the exploration
for and/or development of any part of the hydrocarbon resources of the country con-
cerned." OPEC Res. XVI.90.
83 OPEC Res. XVI.90.
84 OPEC Res. XVII.93.
85 Only Venezuela has fully incorporated OPEC's "Pro-Forma Regulation for the
Conservation of Petroleum Resources" in its conservation laws. See Decree No. 1316 of
Feb. 11, 1969, in OPEC, SELEcTED DOCUMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
INDusTRY, 1969, at 1-14 (Vienna 1970).
86 OPEC Res. IV.33 and XVI.90; OPEC BuLLETmi No. 5, at 4 (1970); OPEC
BuLrLint No. 1, at 4 (1971).
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drainage and rate of decline in producing wells, and another to con-
trol the production and thus the price by preventing output above
the going market demand. Physical and economic waste may be
eliminated under the regime of unitization, but, in the words of
Professor Eugene Rostow, "beyond that there is no plausible reason
for not allowing market forces to determine the scale of output.) 87
The deliberate confusion of conservation with prorationing has
as its purpose the prevention of competition. In the OPEC area
and the United States, conservation has been used as a camouflage
for price control."8 It is, however, beyond question that even the
best and most efficiently administered prorationing policy cannot
achieve anything approaching the goals of conservation. In the
petroleum industry, both domestic and international, any degree of
conservation which is attained by proration plans is incidental to
the primary purpose of most of them, which is profitable returns
above the competitive level on the inflated cost structure. 89
Because of the deliberate confusion of prorationing with con-
servation, many interested, though sometimes conflicting, groups(in the United States, Latin America, and Arab countries)-the
APC, OPEC, IOCC, and API-advocate production control other
than the MER standards. Such production control, however, should
never be confused with scientific conservation. The principal fea-
tures of conservation differ from those of prorationing. An effective
conservation policy involves the application of scientific spacing
procedures; of artificial, secondary or supplementary recovery;
methods for the maintenance of pressure; storage of gas in under-
ground formations; application of sound oil field engineering and
economic principles; prevention of natural gas from burning or from
escaping into the open air in excess of the amount necessary for the
87 E. ROSTOW, supra, note 35, at 122.
88 See IOCC GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE, A STUDY OF CONSERVATION
OF OIL AND GAS IN THE UNITED STATES 128 (Oklahoma City 1964). For the impact of
prorationing upon prices, see OIL CONSERVATION, supra, note 30, at 237-60; A. KAHN,
supra, note 41, at 58; P. Davidson, Public Policy Problems oj the Domestic Crude Oil
Industry, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 97 (1963); J. McKn & S. McDONALD, Petroleum Conser-
vation in Theory and Practice, 76 Q. J. EcoN. 98 (1962); A Kahn, The Depletion Al-
lowance in the Context of Cartelization, 54 Am. ECON. REV. 286 (1964); M. Adelman,
Efficiency of Resource Use in Crude Petroleum, 31 S. ECON. J. 104, 107 (1964); A.
KAHN & M. DE CHAZEAU, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM INDUS-
TRY 429-49 (1959).
89 See Walter J. Nead's testimony, Hearings belore the Subcomm. on Anti-trust
and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., S.
Res. 40, The Petroleum Industry, pt. 1, at 80-2 (Mar. 12, 1969); A. KAHN & M. DE
CHAzEAu, supra, note 88, at 150-1; A. Kahn, The Combined Effects of Prorationing,
The Depletion Allowance and Import Quotas on the Cost of Producing Crude Oil in
the United States, supra, note 41, at 58-9.
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efficient operation of the well; and, in short, efficient utilization of
oil and gas to be produced.9 °
The distinction between prorationing and conservation lies
on these premises. Application of the above mentioned measures are
necessary to prevent intra-field competition. In doing so, production
might indeed be controlled and adjusted to maximize utilization of
underground reservoirs. Thus, control is only incidental to proration-
ing and varies according to the reservoir structure.9 1 To the con-
trary, prorationing is per se control of production.
Per se control suggests that the motivation behind cut back in
production is not a conservational one, but is for the purpose of in-
creasing prices. In the summer of 1970 the Libyan government ap-
plied a series of production cuts which reduced the Occidental Oil
Company's output from 800,000 barrels per day to 485,000 barrels
per day.92 The cut back was applied to the entire Oasis group95
which are at present responsible for thirty-one percent of Libya's
total production. 4 The explanation of the government for the cut
back orders was that the concessionaires did not base their produc-
tion upon conservational measures and did not extract crude oil "in
proportion to capacity."95 The company denied the government's
allegation. No evidence for the parties' claims and counter claims
was made public. No documentation existed to prove or disprove
the respective allowables (of the company or of the government) as
good oil practice. In the Fall of 1970 Occidental had virtually re-
stored its previous daily production, but only after paying the
government's requested price increase totaling $70 Million. There
was no longer a claim by the government regarding the wasteful
production on the part of the company. Occidental continued to
produce in "excess capacity"--conservation requirements of Libya,
notwithstanding.
The Libyan example indicates that in existing international
relations, no automatic correlation between per se production con-
trol and conservation should be expected. Furthermore, the aims
of conservation will not necessarily be fostered by a per se produc-
90 See F. Rouhani, The Legal and Economic Framework: Section 1 Concessions,
Exploration Leases, Production and Conservation Legislation, No. 68-42343, Lecture
No. 8, at 19 (United Nations Inter-regional Seminar on Petroleum Administration,
Trinidad, Apr. 16-27, 1968).
91 See J. Bain, Rostow's Proposals for Petroleum Policy, Eugene V. Rostow, A
Reply, 57 J. PoL. EcoN. 55, 68 (particularly page 56) (1949).
92 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 1 (July 20, 1970).
93 The Oasis Group is composed of Continental, Marathon, Ameradon-Hess and
Shell.
94 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 1 (May 25, 1970).
95 Id. at 2 (July 20, 1970).
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tion control; they may indeed be damaged. In the United States
such damage occurs because the efficient wells are compelled to
produce below their capacity in order to make room for inefficient
ones. The experience may not be so different in the international
arena where the efficiency of fields vary from country to country,
and area to area. When the efficiency of these fields is curtailed by
production control, a visible cost is imposed upon the world com-
munity. The penalization effect of per se control takes place no
matter who applies it (the governments or the international oil com-
panies). From this point of view there is no difference between U.S.
and international prorationing.
Prorationing measures influence the cost of production in two
ways. First, the general economic efficiency is reduced under the
prorationing system. When competitive forces are active, low cost
producers will pre-empt the market, prices will be regulated by
cost, and investment will be directed "toward channels where it
can most effectively increase production in response to consumer
demand.""6 In effective prorationing where there is an agreement
between the producers to restrain their production to a fixed and
prearranged amount, the low cost producers will not have an op-
portunity to pre-empt the market. To the extent that these producers
will not produce, the high cost producers are able to produce. The
second cost effect of prorationing is the interest cost of assets tied
up in the reservoir. Under prorationing the difference between the
actual value of oil in the ground at present, and the discounted
value of the same oil in the future is increased. 7
It may be said that in the United States, prorationing reduces
wasteful production which is inherent in producing fields with
multiple ownership, and therefore prevents "excess production."
This logic is incorrect because beyond the "Rule of Capture," excess
production does not exist. Once the wasteful production of the Rule
of Capture is prevented, the interplay of market forces should de-
termine the rate of production.
Even if excess production was acceptable in the United States
where multiple ownership of reservoirs exist, it is not tenable in the
OPEC area. In OPEC countries the state is the owner of the "unit-
ized" tracts and therefore, conservation justifications for proration-
ing in the United States-though invalid per se-are not applicable
in the OPEC area. There are only a few areas within the OPEC
community where multiplicity of ownership exists (e.g., the Neutral
Zone- Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,98 and the submarine areas-Saudi
96 OIL CONSERVATION, supra, note 30, at 115.
97 H. LuBELL, supra, note 42, at 102.98 See Agreement Between the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
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Arabia and Iran)." In these areas the reservoirs belong to the
governments having jurisdiction over them. In this situation it is
not market demand prorationing which can provide maximum utili-
zation of these co-owner reservoirs but a sound conservation policy
to prevent physical and economic waste. An agreement among the
governments involved would be necessary to determine spacing,
drilling and exploitation practices. For example, the offshore agree-
ment in October 1968 between the governments of Iran and Saudi
Arabia stipulates certain measures with respect to boundary lines 0 0
and prohibition of drilling within a specified radius."0' It goes on to
state that governments
shall ensure that the companies operating under its respective authority
shall not carry out operations that may, for technical inconsistency
with the conservation rules . . .be considered harmful to the oil and
gas reservoir in the [specified] area.10 2
This provision to utilize the efficiency of the common reservoir
between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a conservation measure, in that
it serves the purpose of efficiency. Beyond that there is no logical
reason to control production for conservation.
PRORATIONING IN THE OPEC AREA
A Brief Outline
The counterpart of United States prorationing is production
programming in the OPEC area. Similar to the United States, the
reasons for production programming in ten large exporting countries
of the world are said to be based on the concept that oil is a "non-
renewable asset" 05 and therefore, its production should be con-
trolled by the member countries or by an international agency." 4
Regarding the Partition of the Neutral Zone, (generally known as the Partition Agree-
ment) July 7, 1965 and Supplemental Agreement Approving the Median Line of the
Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone (officiated Jan. 25, 1970). Text, Middle East Economic
Survey No. 32 (June 5, 1970 Supp.). See also Royal Decree No. M-28, dated 12 Dhul
Al-Qa'dah 1389 (Jan. 19, 1970), published in OPEC, SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 1969, at 143-44 (Vienna 1970).
99 Agreement Concerning the Soverignty over the Islands of Al-Arabiyah and
Farsi and the Delimitation of the Boundry Line Separating the Submarine Areas Be-
tween the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Text, OPEC, SELEcTED DOCUMENTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 1968, at 368-70 (Vienna 1969).
100 Id. arts. 2, 3.
101 Id. art. 4.
102 Letter from Abmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum of Saudi Arabia, to
Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal, chairman of the Board of the National Iranian Oil Com-
pany, Oct. 24, 1968. Middle East Economic Survey No. 23 (Apr. 4, 1969 Supp.). This
letter is a complimentary part of the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
103 OPEC Res. IV.33.
104 The idea of establishing an international agency in the OPEC area for the
purpose of market demand forecast was introduced for the first time by Venezuela in
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The real reason behind adoption of production control, as in the
United States, is the price motive. Unlike the United States, the
proponents of global prorationing have not disguised the pricing
motive of production control. It has been repeatedly asserted by the
producing countries that their economic development depends on
oil and therefore, pricing of crude oil 'is extremely vital to their
future economic plans. 105
In the eleven years since the producing countries banded to-
gether, OPEC has grown considerably in stature and experience, and
"has proved itself a force to be reckoned with in the international
oil business.""' This growth is leading OPEC to shift its price
motives from one of applying rather ineffective political pressures
upon the International Oil Companies to one of applying effective
economic restraint upon the world production system. A study of
OPEC's recent resolutions shows that the organization has realized
that it is extremely difficult to establish and maintain the price level,
which it claims should exist in the international oil industry, without
effective international prorationing, i.e., control of supply. 0 7 Indeed,
it would appear that one of the main purposes underlying the estab-
lishment of OPEC's Economic Commission was to make a realistic
study of the world petroleum supply and to consider the possibility
of implementing international production programming.
OPEC is not the only regional organization which advocates
crude oil prorationing. Even prior to OPEC's formation, the Arab
Petroleum Congress (APC) had been trying to achieve price stabi-
lization and production control, and it had been advocating that the
producing countries should exercise their right of sovereignty to
accomplish their production goals. It was in pursuit of these goals
that a systematic prorationing policy, recommended in the Second
and the Sixth APC, and a resolution regarding the relinquishment 10 8
the Third Arab Petroleum Congress. See A. Parra, Oil and Stability (a paper delivered
at the 3d APC, organized by the Secretariat General of the League of Arab States,
Alexandria, 1961).
105 The OPEC countries have paid more attention to the price of crude oil for the
purpose of their economic development than any other aspect of the operation of the
oil industry in their countries. There are, however, fundamental issues involved in
modern concession agreements which are extremely important. These issues are related
to the very modality of a concession agreement and the subjects that such agreements
should cover. See T. Farer, Economic Development Agreements, a Functional Analysis(a paper delivered at the U.N.I.T.A.R. Conference on International Law in Accra,
Ghana, Jan. 14-21, 1971) .
10 Petroleum Press Service 42 (Feb. 1966).
107 For the impact of production control upon international oil prices, see P.
FRANKEL, Ona, THE FACTS OF LrrE 30 (1962).
108 ARAB PETROLEUM CoNGRESS, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SEVENTr ARAB PETRO-
LEUM CONGRESs Rec. 2 (organized by the Secretariat General of the League of
Arab States, Kuwait, Mar. 16-22, 1970).
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of oil producing areas by the IOC in the Seventh APC, gained the
emphatic approval of its member countries. 109 Inasmuch as three
founding"' and four regular members"' of OPEC are also members
of the APC, there exists a common interest between these two or-
ganizations with regard to production policy; therefore, it should
not be surprising if in the future they adopt similar policies with
respect to prorationing.
The prorationing policy recommended in the Second and Sixth
APC is, in terms of its exactitude, more definite than the experimen-
tal production program of OPEC; it is actually a formalized one.
This policy is, with some exceptions, more or less similar to the
policy implemented in the United States. One significant difference
is .to be found in the justifications given for prorationing. In the
United States, the following cliches are offered to justify proration-
ing: conservation, prevention of waste, protection of correlative
rights, and the myth that "price rise"' is incidental to proration-
ing. 113 These justifications are used as a camouflage for price con-
trol. On the other hand, both OPEC and the APC admit that pricing
is at least as commanding a motivation for prorationing as is con-
servation. For example, in the Sixth Arab Petroleum Congress some
members insisted that a "pragmatic solution" to the world's unused
capacity "makes it a must for exporting countries to adopt export
restrictions by imposing an international prorationing system, as
the sole avenue for keeping prices from any decline that leads to
deterioration of price per unit."' 4 Indeed, the Sixth APC witnessed
no prorationing proposal in which price increase or price stability
was not mentioned as a justifying factor.115
The ultimate goals of OPEC, with regard to prorationing, are
not very different from those of the APC. In fact the very first reso-
109 See OPEC, Progressive Relinquishment Under OPEC Declaratory Statement
of Policy of 1968 (a paper presented at the Seventh APC, Kuwait 1970).
110 These members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq.
111 These members are Algeria, Libya, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi.
112 General Thompson, Chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission, has em-
phatically stressed that "we have nothing to do with price," and that "we are for-
bidden to consider economics.. . ." J. HARTSHORN, supra, note 22, at 21. See also Gen-
eral Thompson's statements, supra, note 70.
113 State v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93 (1930) ; Danciger Oil & Refining Co.
v. R.R. Commission of Texas, supra, note 27, at 839.
114 Sixth APC, supra, note 56, at 14.
115 Even Abdulhady Taher, the Governor of Saudi Arabia's General Petroleum
and Mineral Organization (PETROMIN) who has not adhered to the idea of inter-
national prorationing, suggested in the Sixth APC meeting that prices of world oil
should be "administered," by a collaboration between the International Oil Companies
and the exporting countries. The price agreements of February 1971 between the IOC
and the Persian Gulf producers has proved that Mr. Taher has not been wrong in his
anticipations. See A. Taher, Sixth APC, supra, note 56, at 25; A. Taher, OPEC Semi-
nar, supra, note 2, at 267.
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lution of OPEC referred to the fact that the member countries can-
not remain indifferent to price problems. This resolution affirmed the
determination of OPEC to "study and formulate a system to ensure
the stabilization of prices by, among other things, the regulation of
production."" 6 To date, OPEC has made two attempts to regulate
the production of international petroleum: First, the "Transitory
Production Programme," attempted in 1965, ending in failure; and
second, "Joint Production Programming" to begin in 1972.
OPEC's Transitory Production Programming
In the first year following its formation, OPEC concentrated
on the question of prorationing as a means for achieving its eco-
nomic goals.117 OPEC's early resolutions (implicitly)"' and its
architects (explicitly)'" advocated international prorationing of
production by means of an "international compact." 20 It was not
until July 1965121 that OPEC, in the face of compelling pressures,'22
announced its Transitory Production Programme. The Conference
said in part that:
With a view to counteracting erosion of crude and product prices;
considering that one of the contributing factors to the deterioration of
crude and product prices is the unrestricted competitive use of the
excess producing capacity ...
resolves
1. to adopt as a transitory measure a production plan calling for ra-
116 OPEC Res. 1.1.
117 D. HIRST, OIL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 108 (1966).
118 ".. [M. embers shall study and formulate a system to ensure stabilization
of prices by, among other means, the regulation of production with due regard to the
interests of producing and of the consuming nations .... ." OPEC Res. 1.1(3).
119 The reference is to Sheik Tariki of Saudi Arabia and to Perez Alfonzo of
Venezuela, both eminent and influential Ministers of Petroleum in their respective
countries at the time they engineered OPEC.
120 See Middle East Economic Survey (Sept. 23, 1960).
121 Despite all the arguments in the APC meetings, and the resolutions of OPEC,
no affirmative step was taken by OPEC to establish a viable production policy: The
basic reasons for OPEC's inactive position in establishing a uniform production pro-
gram were (a) the disparity in production policies between the member countries,
and (b) OPEC's preoccupation with the "expensing royalty." The first obstacle was
apparently modified by a qualified understanding among the member countries. The
second problem was resolved by OPEC's success in establishing a uniform expensing
royalty system throughout the member countries (except Libya). See note 21, supra.
122 These pressures were from different directions: First, from Venezuela which
had adopted a limited production policy even before OPEC was established; second,
from international oil spokesmen such as Abdullah Tariki and Dr. Alfonzo (who were
the Ministers of Minerals and Petroleum from Saudi Arabia and Venezuela respec-
tively, at the time of the formation of OPEC); and third, from the public in some
Arab countries which were advocating planning of supply as an effective means "to
the companies' cartelized lifting arrangements." See G. STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST, A
STUDY IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROVERSY 385 (1970).
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tional increases in production from the OPEC area to meet estimated
increases in world demand; and
2. to submit a production program to the Governments of Member
Countries for approval.123
OPEC's prorationing plans, when formed, were not concerned
with the already established rate of production in its members'
countries, but rather dealt with scheduling any increase in the rate
of production with respect to the world market demand.
To implement its instructions, which are analogous to legislative
acts, the OPEC Conference formulated a production program for
a trial run of twelve months. This program was to work as follows.
A base year was established for the purpose of estimating changes
in demand for petroleum and petroleum products in OPEC's mar-
kets. Then a calculation of the percentage rise in demand in OPEC's
markets was made based upon the base year. From this calculation
allowables with regard to the increase in demand were set for each
OPEC country. Each member's original, unprorated production
(production in the base year) was added to the allowable in order
to determine the total production permitted for each member in the
given year. The target-percentage increase was, therefore, allocated
among the individual OPEC countries. In the last three months of
each twelve month period the OPEC producing countries were to
instruct their concessionaire companies "not to produce more than
enough to bring the yearly percentage increase up to the amount
allotted under the finally revised programme.') 124
Table 1 illustrates the mechanism of this experimental pro-
rationing system. The first two columns indicate actual production.
Column three indicates the actual percentage increase over the
base year in a given period. The last column, however, is a given
one. It represents the percentage change of production allocated to
each member country for the given period. The table compares each
OPEC member's production for the second half of 1965, i.e., the
first half of the experimental twelve month period, with its produc-
tion for the corresponding period in 1964, and it compares the per-
centage increase of each OPEC member's production during the
first half of the experimental period with the target set for each
member's growth during the given period by the production pro-
gram. It is to be noted that the purpose of the production target for
each member under the program was to regulate the production of
that member so that the total would not exceed the absorptive ca-
pacity of the market.
123 OPEC Res. IX.61.
124 J. HARTSHORN, supra, note 22, at 334.
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TABLE 1125
OPEC's TRANSITORY PRODUCTION PROGRAMME
(Thousand Metric Tons)
July-Dec. July-Dec. 7 Actual % Planned
1964 1965 Change Increase'
26
Kuwait 58,080 57,600 -0.8 +6.5
Saudi Arabia 50,790 53,800 +5.9 +12.
Iran 43,560 50,300 +15.5 +17.5
Iraq 31,350 32,500 +3.7 +10.0
Qatar 12 7  5,150 5,230 +1.6 +32.0
Venezuela 89,770 91,770 +2.2 +3.3
Libya 23,320 30,300 +30.0 +20.0
Indonesia 12,570 12,250 -2.5 +10.0
Total OPEC 315,590 333,750 +6.1 +10.0
The ultimate aim of OPEC's Transitory Production Programme
was stated by the Organization in the Sixth Arab Petroleum Con-
gress of 1967. In this Congress, the paper delivered by OPEC
announced that the Transitory Production Programme had been de-
signed with the object of "eliminating some of the inherent causes
of price instability, namely, the excessive competition made possible
by the prevailing surplus producing capacity." 2 " It is, therefore,
beyond question that the underlying factor behind the attempt by
OPEC to "program" its crude oil was an oligopolistic effort to
"stabilize" the price of international petroleum.
Aside from the inclusion of price among its justifications for
prorationing, both OPEC and various APC participants have re-
sorted to the same rationalization for restricting production as have
the advisory and regulatory agencies (e.g., Bureau of Mines, Inter-
state Oil Compact Commission and Texas Railroad Commission)
and private interests (e.g., API and owners of marginal wells) in
125 Petroleum Press Service 43 (Feb. 1966).
120 OPEC's planned increase in production:
(Thousand Barrel Daily)
1965-66 1966-67
Iran 304 304
Saudi Arabia 254 290
Libya 210 210
Kuwait 147 147
Iraq 125 125
Venezuela 115 115
Qatar 67 50
Indonesia 48 48
OPEC Total 1,270 1,289
Source: Petroleum Press Service 244 (July 1966)
127 The figures for Qatar are rather misleading. The thirty-two percent target
increase was intended to take account of the anticipated increase in this country's pro-
duction due to Shell's offshore production.
128 OPEC, Collective Influences in the Recent Trend Towards the Stabilization of
International Crude and Product Prices, Sixth APC, supra, note 56, at 9.
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the United States. There is, however, one additional justification for
prorationing made by some technocrats in the OPEC area. In es-
sence, it has been argued that all large scale petroleum exporting
regions fall into the category of economically underdeveloped coun-
tries. These countries are characterized by a total dependence upon
one commodity. Thus, the fact that petroleum is the principal source
of income for the OPEC countries "leaves these countries no al-
ternative, in their efforts to stabilize their economic foundations...
but to adopt a policy of conservation of resources, which would
have the effect of stabilizing crude oil prices through proration-
ing."' 29 The economic predicament of the developing countries has
been used as a justification to curtail the production of international
petroleum. According to this line of reasoning, prorationing of
petroleum cannot be justified in countries such as the United States
and perhaps Venezuela, where the "principal source of income" is
not entirely dependent upon one commodity. Yet these two countries
have applied very stringent controls over their production of crude
oil. Furthermore, the predicament of the underdeveloped OPEC
countries, on which the whole case for external control over pro-
duction is grounded, is temporary, and consequently prorationing
must be eliminated as soon as the economic situations in these
countries are improved.
OPEC's Joint Production Programme for the Seventies
The Transitory Production Program of 1965-1966 was an
experimental plan to be applied for a specified period of time in the
OPEC countries. For reasons which will be enumerated later, Tran-
sitory Production Programming was not successful in increasing
the prices of crude oil. Following this failure, the prevalent view
was that there would not be any future attempts toward production
programming by OPEC. However, OPEC's renewed attempts in
late 1970 to study and adopt a global production program clearly
indicates the fallacy of this idea. Indeed, some of the leaders of the
exporting countries have firmly supported OPEC in establishing a
global prorationing policy. In his inaugural speech at the OPEC
Conference in December 1970, President Rafael Caldera of Vene-
zuela manifested an emphasis on production programming:
We believe in the need for [production] programming--for planning,
for rational, sound and logical planning so as to understand the future
changes of consumption . . . [It may] lead us to a better understand-
ing of what the future holds for us.130
129 M. Joukdar, Petroleum: Supply, Demand, Production Controls and Price
Cuts, al-Bilad (Saudi Daily), Aug. 10, 1959.
180 OPEC Buixzme No. 1, at S.
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Venezuela's Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons was more ex-
plicit on planning for production. Speaking on behalf of the Govern-
ment he, like the proponents of prorationing in the United States,
emphasized the detrimental effect of surplus producing capacity.
A global production program was held to be the solution. He em-
phasized that:
[F]or long-term solutions to the ever-present danger of the surplus
producing capacity adversely affecting prices, we should continue our
studies in the search for a rational device to programme production
increases in our countries.' 3 '
Production programming has also been advocated by other chiefs
of OPEC statesY.3 2
The first step for a global production policy in the Seventies
was taken by the OPEC Conference of June 1970. OPEC charged
its Economic Commission to study the feasibility of adopting a pro-
duction plan for the period of 1971-75.13' According to this plan the
increases in production will be based upon a schedule to be accepted
by the member countries. It is emphasized within the OPEC com-
munity that the focus of this program is not to restrict production
and not to create an artificial shortage of oil supplies. Rather, the
objectives of this production program are "to rationalize and co-
ordinate future increases in oil production by the OPEC members
in such a way as to relate such increases to the growth of world
demand and prevent the deterioration of prices."' 34 If there were
still any doubts regarding OPEC's intention to establish global
prorationing, they should be eliminated by OPEC's pronouncement
at the Caracas Conference in December 1970. In this Conference
OPEC resolved:
1. to form a Standing Committee of high ranking representatives of
each Member Country that shall hold its first meeting at the Head-
quarters of the Secretariat before the end of January 1971 with a
view to determining the relevant factors that must be taken into
account for the formulation of a definite and realistic Joint Pro-
duction Programme for Member Countries for the period beginning
in 1972 ....
2. to instruct the Secretary General and the Economic Commission
to maintain under continuous study all developments which may
affect the objectives pursued by the Joint Production Programme
and to report to the above Committee and to the Conference.' 3 5
181 Id. at 7.
132 See, e.g., President H. Boumedienne's inaugural speech at OPEC's Conference
of June 1970. OPEC BULLETiN No. 5, at 4 (1970).
133 OPEC Res. XX.112.
'34 Middle East Economic Survey No. 36, at 1 (July 3, 1970).
135 OPEC Res. XX.121.
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Thus, through the Caracas resolution, OPEC entered a new stage
in 1971 with a definite intention to establish a production program
starting in 1972 for the countries which supply eighty-five percent
of the world production outside the United States and the Soviet
Union.
The foregoing discussion indicates that contrary to the Tran-
sitory Production Programme of 1965, OPEC is deploying its
resources to establish a "definite" and "realistic" joint production
program. This production program is in its embryonic state and
nothing has been disclosed about its mechanism. However, many
of the problems discussed below which explain the reasons for the
failure of the early Transitory Production Programme, are also
applicable to the Joint Production Programme initiated by the
Caracas Doctrine.
PROBLEMS OF GLOBAL PRODUCTION PROGRAMMING
Conflicting Interests Between the IOC and OPEC Regarding Pro-
duction
The inevitable conflict of interests occur between the Interna-
tional Oil Companies and OPEC in determining the allowables of
a producing country. OPEC and the IOC may apply different criteria
when determining allowables. In deciding the allowable of a country
the IOC applies in part the "off-take" mechanism and the "diversifi-
cation" policy as criteria. 8 These two elements are not, and need
not be, considered here in detail but are the bases of understanding
the possible future conflicts between the IOC and OPEC policies.
The International Oil Companies use the off-take mechanism as
their own form of "production programming" in the producing coun-
tries. In a given country (e.g., Saudi Arabia), a concessionaire,
which is an operating company (e.g., Aramco), is composed of
several International Oil Companies (e.g., Texaco 30%, Mobil
10%, Standard Oil of California 30%, and Standard Oil of New
Jersey 30%). The total production in a concession area is deter-
mined by the IOC according to the arrangements-termed off-take
agreements-made among them, by which current output could be
lifted by the operating company. The off-take by an International
Oil Company (e.g., Standard Oil Company in the Aramco Conces-
sion) is not necessarily determined by the percentage of investment
in the concession (30%), but by variables such as refinery capacity,
refinery needs, transportation and storage facilities and particularly
136 For more details, see E. PENROSE, THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL FIRM IN DEVEL-
oPINo COUNTRIES: THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 150-72 (1968).
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the contractual obligations of the International Oil Company. The
total production in a concession area will be affected by these
variables and by the off-take agreements among the co-owners of a
concession agreement.
Diversification is related to the production policy of the Inter-
national Oil Companies based upon several factors, not the least of
which is their own security of supply. These companies do not rely
upon one source of supply no matter how economically attractive it
might be. Particularly as a result of lessons learned from nationaliza-
tion of the oil industry in Iran, the companies pursue a diversifica-
tion policy so that they will not have to bend to the pressure of one
producing country. Pursuance of a diversification policy is certainly
an important factor in determining the total production of a con-
cession area.
It is beyond any doubt that in determining the production
share of a country the International Oil Companies apply both diver-
sification and off-take mechanisms. On the other hand, the precise
mechanism to be used in the future by OPEC for production pro-
gramming is not known. During the Transitory Production Pro-
gramme, OPEC did not reveal the criteria for determining its allow-
ables. According to one source, the target rates in the first and second
years of the experimental prorationing period were mostly "based
upon forward production estimates submitted by the International
Oil Companies to their host governments."'31 7 That is to say, in the
Transitory Production Programme OPEC used the same production
schedule that the International Oil Companies have traditionally
applied in each producing country, i.e., one based upon considerations
of off-take agreements and diversification policy. This method of
programming failed, but the Joint Production Programme, perhaps
for the next decade, is now being formulated and the question of
determining the allowable of each producing country-as complex as
it is-has to be faced.
Will OPEC in its Joint Production Programme once again
follow the rate of production established by the International Oil
Companies? OPEC's economic goals, for the most part, are different
from, if not in conflict with, those of the International Oil Compa-
nies. It is doubtful that OPEC can achieve its economic goals by
applying the production schedule which was created for, and fitted to,
the special production policy of the International Oil Companies.
How can the OPEC production schedule be identical to that of the
Internationals when the latter companies are seeking a diversified
137 Petroleum Press Service 43 (Feb. 1966).
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production system, whereas OPEC's production will be limited to
the OPEC area? These two production schedules-OPEC's and theIOC's-cannot be identical since OPEC would determine a mem-ber's allowables irrespective of the IOC's marketing obligations,
whereas the Internationals' production schedule is based upon the
off-take agreements. Internationals from the United States have todetermine their production policy in such a way as to not blatantlygo against the United States' antitrust laws, whereas OPEC need
not act within these laws. Obviously, different production policies
adapted to these specific demands are needed.
In scheduling their production, the American International OilCompanies must adjust their operations according to the UnitedStates' import regulations. Does OPEC have such restrictions?
These regulations limit the importation of oil from the OPEC coun-
tries to a compulsory import quota (Mexican and Canadian oil are
exempted from quota restrictions)."' How can OPEC's production
schedules be consistent with those of the IOC, when the Interna-
tional Oil Companies will produce less whenever they pay higher
royalties (an example of such being Venezuela)? OPEC's allow-
ables for its members are supposed to be determined irrespective
of the royalty arrangement between that member and her concession-
aire company. Finally, since the formation of OPEC, Venezuela has
continuously complained of the surplus production in international
markets. This surplus oil is claimed to be the result of the application
of the production schedule determined by the International OilCompanies. Assuming that OPEC was able to establish the allow-
ables of its member countries, a basic question would remain: Will
member countries with restricted allowables be able to limit their
respective IOC concessionaires from additional production?
The complexity of issues in reaching a production allowable for
a country is evident from the above discussion. It is clear however
that although there is a basic commonality of interest between theInternational Oil Companies and OPEC in production control,
OPEC's determination of allowables for an individual producing
country should be consistent with its own goals and be substantially
different from the determination of allowables made by the IOCs.Consequently, the Internationals' production schedule for individual
countries will not be applicable to OPEC's production program. Un-less OPEC wants to get results opposite to its interests, OPEC
should not apply them in its prorationing scheme.
138 Adjusting Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products into the United
States, Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, as amended, § 1(a) (4). See TiE On IM-
POaRT QUESTION, supra, note 38, at 1-17.
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Rate of Production
An important factor for success in prorationing is the confor-
mity of producing countries to the production rates prescribed by
the regulatory agencies. In establishing an allowable for a country,
OPEC has to take into consideration factors such as the historical
conditions (past performance of the producing area), the present
reserve capacity, the demand situation (with regard to specific
gravity), and the social and economic needs of both the producing
and the consuming countries.8 9 These factors are not easy to de-
termine. For example, by taking the simplest factor into account,
the demand for crude oil of a particular gravity, the difficulty of
production programming becomes visible. If a demand for a particu-
lar gravity increased at a faster rate than had been envisaged by
OPEC, will the member which can supply the crude oil of that
gravity be willing to restrain its production? Will other members
allow the discordant member to produce at the expense of the entire
OPEC community? The experience with the expensing royalties 4 °
clearly indicates that the answer to the question should be in the
negative. In 1967 the International Oil Companies and OPEC based
the royalty payment schedule (in part) upon the gravity of the
crude oil.' This solution put countries such as Libya, with light
gravity oil, at a disadvantage. Thus, Libya expressly declined to join
other OPEC members in accepting the agreed royalty formula.'42
Determination of the "fair" rate of increase for each producing
country during the time of OPEC's Transitory Programme was al-
most impossible, considering the ever presence of some of the above
mentioned problems. Table 1, page 31, indicates that with two excep-
tions, the actual percentage increase in production fell short of target
rates during the first half of the production program. The aggregate
increase for all of the OPEC countries was slightly more than six
percent, whereas an increase of ten percent was planned. If OPEC's
objectives were to control the rate of production, Table 1 would be
encouraging. It could also be argued that the pattern of each mem-
ber's growth rate in the second half of 1965 was broadly in line with
that fixed at the OPEC Conference and thus OPEC was successful
in controlling the production in each producing country. This would
189 For more details on problems involved in allocation of allowables among the
member countries, see J. Vafai, 2 The Changing Structure of the International Petro-
leum Industry: A Lexo-Economic Analysis, supra, note 5, at 733-62.
140 See note 21, supra. See also OPEC, OPEC and the Principle of Negotiations
19 (a paper presented by OPEC at the Fifth APC, Mar. 1965).
'41 For the relationship between "gravity differential" and royalty, see Middle
East Economic Survey (Jan. 12, 1968) ; Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 8-9 (Jan. 16,
1965).
142 Petroleum Press Service 45 (Feb. 1968) ; OPEC BULLETnN (Feb. 1968).
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be true if OPEC had a world-oil monopoly, but it does not. In the
absence of such a monopoly, the production growth rate of a member
country which falls behind the growth rate of world demand would
be indicative of the fact that the oil companies have obtained oil
elsewhere, at the expense of OPEC countries, by exercising a diversi-
fication policy. OPEC was fully aware of this fact and, indeed, it
was in search of ways to adjust its production growth without
causing price diminishment, 148 so that such growth would correspond
to the increase in the growth rate of world demand. Unless OPEC
can exercise some control over non-members' production, its pro-
gram will have the effect of expanding rather than restricting produc-
tion.
Diversity of Interests Among OPEC Members
An additional reason for difficulties in prorationing oil in the
OPEC area is to be found in the production policy of non-founding
members. These countries are new producers and their "historical
factors"'144 are not significant; therefore at times it may not be
economically feasible for them to be bound by the average rate of
increase determined by OPEC, since the base to which this increase
is to apply is relatively small. Libya, which has become an oil pro-
ducer only recently-1958- (compared to other OPEC countries),
is a case in point. This country, with a profuse reservoir, reportedly
exceeded the scheduled increase established by OPEC's Transitory
Production Programme and refused 145 to accept the principle of pro-
duction programming. 146 Hence, this country pursued an indepen-
dent course in order to obtain its "fair share" of the world market.
Libya employed price cutting to attain its share, even in the face of
OPEC's production programming, which became a major factor in
143 "The Conference, considering that the unsatisfactory rate of increase of pro-
duction in those Member Countries cannot be ascribed to the lack of outlet for their
crudes in the international market; further, considering that such manipulation of pro-
duction by the oil companies concerned is contrary to the national interest of these
countries;
resolves,
that should these rates of growth not be improved to satisfactory levels during the
year 1966, full support of all OPEC members shall be given to efforts by the countries
concerned to safeguard their legitimate national interests." OPEC Res. XI.73.
144 Consideration of historical factors means simply that the amount of oil pro-
duced in the past is to be a criterion for future allowables.
145 The Oil Minister of Libya, Mr. Kabasi, in expressing his government's reac-
tion to OPEC's Transitory Programme indicated that: "So far as Libya is concerned
there is no production limit, none imposed, and we never accepted one. . . . Libya
plans to go ahead to develop production until it reaches maturity." Petroleum Intelli-
gence Weekly 6 (Aug. 30, 1965).
146 For the reaction of other Arab countries, see G. STOCMNO, supra, note 122,
at 387.
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upsetting OPEC's goal of price stability. 4 7 It is possible that by
their recent membership in OPEC, Abu Dhabi and Algeria will pose
the same problem for this organization. Regarding the fact that these
countries' historical factors are more limited than those of Libya,
the difficulties in controlling their production by OPEC become
obvious. 48
A successful implementation of OPEC's production program
would require that major OPEC producers allow, for newcomers and
potential entrants into the world oil markets, a disproportionate
share of the growing world demand. 4 9
Political Obstacles
The members of OPEC can be broadly classified into two politi-
cal groups: (a) the OPEC members which are inclined to use oil
as a political weapon for collective interests; and (b) the members
which are basically concerned with their own national interests. In
the first group is Libya, Algeria and Iraq. In the second group is
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Indonesia. Venezuela may be classi-
fied into both categories. The dichotomy of the policies between
these two groups can easily be recognized. An example is the 160
mile Israeli pipeline (from Eilat to Ashkelon)' 50 which was con-
structed in 1970 and which takes crude oil of "some unknown
source" to the Mediterranean. While the Arab members of OPEC
condemned the pipeline, and guaranteed that the destined consumer
would not receive the oil, its throughput in 1970 was initially 20
Million tons.' It is reportedly known that the crude oil is supplied
from Iran to the pipeline.'52 Furthermore, Iran maintains bartered
agreements with Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and
Poland. The supplementary agreement between Iran and Rumania
provides for 14.5 Million barrels of Iranian crude oil being exported
to Rumania in 1971. This oil "is believed to go through the trans-
Israel pipeline." 53
147 Once Libya reached a level of production comparable to the other major
OPEC producing countries, it proceeded at a more sober pace and correspondingly the
pressure of Libyan oil on the world market was reduced.
148 Abu Dhabi is virtually without established "historical factors." It was not
until July 1962 that oil was exported for the first time from Umm Sharif and not un-
til December 1963, from Murban. OPEC BuLLETiN (Oct. 1967).
149 J. HARTSHORN, supra, note 22, at 347.
150 Petroleum Press Service 126 (Apr. 1970).
151 Middle East Economic Survey No. 5, at 7 (Nov. 27, 1970).
152 See, e.g., Petroleum Press Service 109 (Mar. 1971). In an interview with the
Beruit Daily, al Hayah on July 28, 1968, Mr. Yamani, Saudi's Minister of Petroleum
and Mining, mildly denied that Iran participated in the trans-Israel pipeline, on the
basis of Iran being a "muslim sister country." Middle East Economic Survey No. 40,
at 9 (Aug. 2, 1968).
153 Petroleum Press Service 109 (Mar. 1971).
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The general policy of Iran regarding the amount of annual
production in the country is another example of the dichotomy of
policy within OPEC member countries. Venezuela has consistently
applied a limited production policy, while Iran has followed the
policy of maximum production. Both countries expect that the Inter-
national Oil Companies will follow their respective policies. Thus,
there is an intrinsic obstacle to OPEC's Joint Production Pro-
gramme which seems very hard to overcome. First, the interests of
these two political camps would have to be reconciled. It seems that
the countries in the first category would be more amenable to Joint
Production Programming than the latter countries. Second, the
interests of the Arab members of OPEC would have to be reconciled
with those of Venezuela at a time when Western Europe, the "natural
market" of Arab exporting countries, is not protected against non-
Arab supplies. In June 1967, when the Suez Canal was closed, the
malleability of a joint production policy among the OPEC members
became obvious. While the Middle Eastern members of OPEC
(except Iran) reduced their exports, the Venezuelan and Iranian
production rate increased. In fact, after June 1967 OPEC admitted
that the Suez crisis had caused Venezuela to "utilize its surplus-
producing oil capacity." 5 4 As in any cartel situation, these latter
countries preferred to increase their production and violate the code
of "cartel ethics" where their national interests did not coincide with
the interests of the cartel.
Other Problems
The issues discussed above are by no means an exhaustive
enumeration of problems of OPEC's Prorationing Policy. Rather,
the discussion represents only a brief mention of difficulties related
to the administrative process of global prorationing.
A myriad of problems in Joint Production Programming remain
which are neither mentioned nor considered in the preceding dis-
cussion. These problems may be broadly divided into two segments.
First, technical problems require consideration in calculating
the allowables of member countries, such as the crude oil gravity,
the rate of decline of oil wells, the allocation of allowables for a new
member, special allowables for discovery wells, regulations regarding
"over-trading" and "under-trading," and reservoir capacities in the
member and non-member countries.
Second, and far more significant, are the problems of economics.
154 OPEC BULLETIN 3 (Sept. 1967). See also Petroleum Press Service 251 (July
1967).
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These include: Elasticity of demand in crude oil and products;
impact of vertical integration upon prorationing; the degree of
protectionism in Europe of indigenous sources of energy; competi-
tive sources of energy (coal, shale oil, tar sands, electricity, nuclear
energy, natural gas); energy trends in consuming countries; surplus
capacity; economics of scale in refining; cost analysis (conventional
cost studies, user cost, cost of production below MER, user cost of
unitization, comparative costs in four main production regions of
the world-the United States, Venezuela, the Middle East and North
Africa); price analysis (effect of prices on excess production capac-
ity, impact of U.S. Gulf prices upon the prices in the OPEC area,
repercussions of the Suez Canal closure on the c.i.f. prices).'55
The complexities of these problems need not be stressed here.
Neither OPEC nor any member country has made a thorough study
of these issues. 56 Nor are there any definite answers for the many
economic problems mentioned.' 57 Yet understanding these complex
problems is a sine qua non for success of OPEC's ambitious Joint
Production Programme. Thus the first task of OPEC is an economic
one. Economic understanding is the test of OPEC's strength.
CONCLUSION
The International Petroleum Industry has been subject to
fundamental changes in the past decade. These developments are
basically the reflection of the extraordinary value of oil as the single
largest source of energy, and of economic consciousness of the large
exporting countries of the world-constituting OPEC-supplying
eighty-five percent of the petroleum outside the United States and
the Soviet Union. The predominant concept emerging from this
myriad of developments is production programming by the oil pro-
ducing countries rather than the International Oil Companies. The
Arab and Venezuelan spokesmen have urged that oil is no longer a
raw material subject to the negotiation of vested interests-"it is
a matter of justice."' 58 Despite this conceptualization, the inspira-
tional and justificatory sources of production programming are pre-
155 For an analysis of some of these problems, see J. Vafai, supra, note 5, at
733-1172.
156 Before adoption of the Transitory Production Programme, Arthur D. Little,
Inc., was assigned to make a comprehensive analysis of profits and prices in the inter-
national petroleum industry. The study has never been disclosed but G. Stocking
believes that Arthur D. Little's study recognized "serious obstacles to international pro-
rationing." See G. STOCKING, supra, note 122, at 382.
157 For an added view on some of these problems, see K. SAYEGH, OIL AND ARAB
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 190-244 (1968).
158 Address by President R. Caldera of Venezuela at the Inaugural Ceremony of
the 21st OPEC Conference. OPEC BuLLETIN No. 1, at 4 (1971).
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dominately evident in the prorationing systems prevalent in the
United States. In fact, in both the United States and the OPEC area,
production control has been defended on the grounds of conservation
of natural resources, and national and financial security.
The reasons traditionally offered in defense of the prorationing
regime in the United States cannot be employed to justify a global
prorationing system in the Middle East, North Africa, Venezuela
and other OPEC areas. Neither the legal cliches (e.g., multiplicity
of ownership) nor the economic slogans (e.g., social optimum)
habitually adopted for prorationing in the United States are appli-
cable in the OPEC area. Even if the justifications for prorationing
made in the United States were applicable in the OPEC area, the
endemic problem still remains: Prorationing in the United States
per se is a non-conservation system. This system is in effect a camou-
flage to formulate those motivations far beyond, and alien to, conser-
vation and efficiency. Indeed, in the petroleum industry, on both the
national and international levels, the degree of conservation which
is attained by production control is incidental to the primary purpose
of it, which is motivated by price. Such motivation in the OPEC
area has emerged as a path toward long-awaited economic develop-
ment.
The recently intensified controversies over the pricing'59 and
percentage 160 of crude oil between the International Oil Companies
on the one hand, and OPEC countries on the other, is an indication
of the nationalistic goals of the OPEC countries to forge ahead on
the course of industrialization through higher prices.' Paralleling
159 These controversies are temporarily diminished by the Teheran and Tripoli
agreements of February 15 and April 2, 1971 respectively. The Teheran agreement
between the twenty-two international and independent oil companies on the one
hand, and six governments-Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar
-on the other provides for the following price agreement:
(a) Thirty-three cents a barrel increase in posted prices;
(b) Two cents increase in settlement of freight disputes;
(c) Upward adjustment of posted prices for heavy crude oil;
(d) An extra cent a barrel increase to the 310 (Iranian heavy, Abrabian mediam
and Kuwait) and 6 cents increase in Basrah crude;
(e) Elimination of the royalty allowances (the gravity differentials related to
expensing royalties) ;
(f) Regular increase in posted prices until 1975 to adjust to the inflationary in-
crease in manufacturing products consumed by the oil producing Persian Gulf
countries.
This agreement does not apply to crude oil piped from Iraq and Saudi Arabia to
Mediterranean terminals.
160 The Caracas Resolution of December 1970 calls for a break in the traditional
50/50 tax arrangements, i.e., an increase of producing countries' tax share from fifty
percent to fifty-five percent. After protracted negotiations between the IOC and the
Persian Gulf producing countries, the former accepted the new tax system in February
1971. See note 21, supra.
161 Although the historic agreement between the International Oil Companies and
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the time honored economic theory, the Caracas Resolution of De-
cember 1970 declared that production control by the OPEC coun-
tries should be a substantial factor in maintaining high prices.
To implement this motivation, OPEC has created a mandate
to establish a Joint Production Programme for its members. The
numerous economic and political obstacles (some of which have
been discussed in this article) will pose serious difficulties for the
success of this mandate. If the mandate is successful, the world
will witness the most effective cartel for its needed energy in the
Seventies.
the OPEC members of the Persian Gulf has been generally described as a triumph for
the producing countries, such "triumph" is not without repercussions upon the Joint
Production Programme. According to the agreement the contractual parties have
agreed not to increase the posted prices of crude oil (except within the framework of
the agreement) for a period of 5 years. As was noted, one of the fundamental pur-
poses behind the control of production was price increase. Does not this price stabiliza-
tion agreement between the IOC and the Persian Gulf Producing Countries off-set the
purpose of Joint Production Programming?
